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ABSTRACT
Application of Fault Analysis to Some Cryptographic Standards
Onur Duman
Cryptanalysis methods can be classiﬁed as pure mathematical attacks, such as linear
and differential cryptanalysis, and implementation dependent attacks such as power anal-
ysis and fault analysis. Pure mathematical attacks exploit the mathematical structure of
the cipher to reveal the secret key inside the cipher. On the other hand, implementation
dependent attacks assume that the attacker has access to the cryptographic device to launch
the attack. Fault analysis is an example of a side channel attack in which the attacker is as-
sumed to be able to induce faults in the cryptographic device and observe the faulty output.
Then, the attacker tries to recover the secret key by combining the information obtained
from the faulty and the correct outputs. Even though fault analysis attacks may require
access to some specialized equipment to be able to insert faults at speciﬁc locations or at
speciﬁc times during the computation, the resulting attacks usually have time and memory
complexities which are far more practical as compared to pure mathematical attacks.
Recently, several AES-based primitives were approved as new cryptographic standards
throughout the world. For example, Kuznyechik was approved as the standard block cipher
in Russian Federation, and Kalyna and Kupyna were approved as the standard block cipher
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and the hash function, respectively, in Ukraine. Given the importance of these three new
primitives, in this thesis, we analyze their resistance against fault analysis attacks.
Firstly, we modiﬁed a differential fault analysis (DFA) attack that was applied on AES
and applied it on Kuzneychik. Application of DFA on Kuznyechik was not a trivial task
because of the linear transformation layer used in the last round of Kuznyechik. In order
to bypass the effect of this linear transformation operation, we had to use an equivalent
representation of the last round which allowed us to recover the last two round keys using
a total of four faults and break the cipher.
Secondly, we modiﬁed the attack we applied on Kuzneychik and applied it on Kalyna.
Kalyna has a complicated key scheduling and it uses modulo 264 addition operation for
applying the ﬁrst and last round keys. This makes Kalyna more resistant to DFA as com-
pared to AES and Kuznyechik but it is still practically breakable because the number of
key candidates that can be recovered by DFA can be brute-forced in a reasonable time. We
also considered the case where the SBox entries of Kalyna are not known and showed how
to recover a set of candidates for the SBox entries.
Lastly, we applied two fault analysis attacks on Kupyna hash function. In the ﬁrst case,
we assumed that the SBoxes and all the other function parameters are known, and in the
second case we assumed that the SBoxes were kept secret and attacked the hash function
accordingly. Kupyna can be used as the underlying hash function for the construction
of MAC schemes such as secret IV, secret preﬁx, HMAC or NMAC. In our analysis, we
showed that secret inputs of Kupyna can be recovered using fault analysis.
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To conclude, we analyzed two newly accepted standard ciphers (Kuznyechik, Kalyna)
and one newly approved standard hash function (Kupyna) for their resistance against fault
attacks. We also analyzed Kalyna and Kupyna with the assumption that these ciphers can
be deployed with secret user deﬁned SBoxes in order to increase their security.
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According to Ron Rivest, “Cryptography is about communication in the presence of an
adversary” [75]. In this communication, two honest parties, usually referred to as Alice
and Bob, communicate over an insecure channel which can be, for example, a telephone
line, a wireless channel, the internet, or a company network. Messages can be English text,
numerical data or anything as long as they can be understood by both Alice and Bob. Since
the channel is insecure, messages sent between Alice and Bob can also be received by other
parties. Those other parties may include an adversary whose goal may be listening to the
communication between Alice and Bob without their approval. The adversary is able to
read, modify and delete those messages. In order to prevent the adversary from reading
the messages and understanding the communication between Alice and Bob, encryption is
used. If the messages are encrypted, the adversaries can still read messages between Alice
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and Bob, but they cannot understand them since they do not know the secret key used in
the encryption; in order to perform encryption, ciphers, which map a given plaintext into a
ciphertext under a secret key, are used.
There are two kinds of ciphers, namely, block ciphers and stream ciphers. If the block
cipher uses the same key for encryption and decryption, it is called symmetric-key block
cipher. In this case, the key is called private key since the key has to be only known
by the communicating parties. If the block cipher uses different keys for encryption and
decryption, it is called asymmetric key block cipher. In asymmetric key block ciphers, each
party has a public key and a private key. The ciphertext is generated using the public key
of the receiving party and that ciphertext is decrypted by the receiver using the receiver’s
private key. The public key is known by all participants but the private key has to be kept
secret by the receiver. Stream ciphers encrypt individual characters of the input plaintext
one at a time using a keystream. If the keystream is generated independently from the
plaintext messages and of the ciphertext, it is called synchronous stream cipher. If the
keystream is generated as a function of the key and a ﬁxed number of previous ciphertext
characters, it is called self-synchronizing (asynchronous) stream cipher [57].
Even though ciphers prevent the adversary from understanding the communication be-
tween Alice and Bob, they do not prevent the adversary from modifying or deleting mes-
sages without being detected. In order to achieve that, integrity mechanisms are needed.
In order to provide message integrity, hash functions are used as building blocks. Hash
functions are mappings which take a message as input and generate a ﬁxed size output
called hash code [57]. In the case of communication between Alice and Bob, if Alice
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wants to send a message M to Bob, Alice calculates the hash of the message H(M) and
sends (M,H(M)) to Bob. After that, if Bob wants to make sure the message has not been
modiﬁed, Bob calculates H(M) from M and compares this calculated value with the hash
value sent by Alice. If these values match, Bob is sure that the message has not been (ac-
cidentally) modiﬁed. However, an attacker may intercept the communication, modify M
to M ′ and H(M) to H(M ′) and send (M ′, H(M ′)) to Bob. In that case, Bob is not able
to detect that the message has been modiﬁed. Also, Bob cannot be sure that the message
comes from Alice. This shows that hash functions alone are not enough to detect modiﬁca-
tions by attackers and they provide no message authenticity. Integrity mechanisms, such as
MAC (Message Authentication Code) schemes or digital signature algorithms are needed
for message integrity and authenticity. MAC schemes can be built using a hash function
with a secret key. In order to verify integrity and authenticity of a message using a MAC
scheme, the receiving party has to know the key used in the MAC scheme. In addition
to MAC schemes, digital signature algorithms can also be used for message integrity and
authenticity. Signatures are generated using a private signature key and veriﬁcation of the
signature is performed using a public veriﬁcation key. So, in the case of digital signature
algorithms, the public veriﬁcation key is known by all participants but the private signature
key has to be only known by the entity signing the message. In most attacks, the adversary
may only be interested in reading the messages between two or more communicating par-
ties. In this case, the adversary is called passive adversary. However, the adversary may
also be interested in changing messages or impersonating the identity of an honest party.
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In this case, the adversary is called an active adversary. A passive adversary threatens con-
ﬁdentiality of the data. An active adversary threatens integrity and authenticity of the data
in addition to its conﬁdentiality [57].
If the adversaries succeed in their goal after performing an attack on a cryptographic
system, we say that the cryptographic system is broken. According to [57], a block ci-
pher is totally broken if the secret key can be found, and partially broken if an adversary
is able to recover part of the plaintext (but not the key) from the ciphertext. In order to
totally break a block cipher, the adversary may try all possible keys in the key space of
the cipher. This is called brute force key search [11]. However, in some cases, brute force
key search can have a very large time complexity. Time complexity is measured by the
number of operations required to apply the algorithm. As an example, in order to recover
a private key with size 128 bits, the average number of operations required to perform
brute force key search is 2
128
2
= 2127. Considering that total number of electrons in the
universe is in the order of 8.37 × 277 [57], 2127 is clearly a very large number. Also, time
complexity of the attack grows exponentially as the key size grows. So, brute force key
search is usually not a practical approach unless the key space of the block cipher is small.
Cryptanalysis can simply be deﬁned as ﬁnding ways to totally or partially break a cipher
without performing brute force key search. Attacks on block ciphers can be classiﬁed as
ciphertext only attacks, known plaintext attacks, chosen plaintext attacks or chosen cipher-
text attacks [72]. In ciphertext only attacks, the adversary only knows a set of ciphertexts
generated by the cryptosystem. In known plaintext attacks, the adversary knows a set of
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(plaintext, ciphertext) pairs. In chosen plaintext attacks, the adversary chooses a plain-
text and asks for its corresponding ciphertext. In chosen ciphertext attacks, the adversary
chooses a ciphertext and asks for its corresponding plaintext. In chosen plaintext/ciphertext
attacks, we assume that the adversaries have access to an encryption/decryption oracle and
they can query it with plaintext/ciphertext of their choice.
Cryptanalysis techniques in the literature can be classiﬁed as mathematical attacks and
implementation dependent attacks. Examples of mathematical attacks include linear crypt-
analysis [54], differential cryptanalysis [15], integral attacks [48] and meet-in-the-middle
attacks [28]. Mathematical attacks aim to exploit the mathematical structure of the ci-
pher. Implementation dependent attacks include side channel analysis (SCA) [45] and fault
analysis [16]. In side channel analysis, the adversary aims to retrieve the secret key us-
ing side channel information. Side Channel Analysis (SCA) exploits information which
is leaked by default while the device is running, such as power usage [42], time taken to
perform the cryptographic operations [12], and acoustics of noise generated during the cal-
culations [35]. In fault analysis, the adversary disrupts the computation by injecting faults
and aims to retrieve the secret information by comparing the correct and faulty results. For
example, a smartcard which contains an embedded processor and presumably stores some
secret key information can be subjected to high temperature outside its operating range,
unsupported supply voltage, or strong magnetic ﬁeld, to inﬂuence the operation of the pro-
cessor. In this case, the processor may begin to output incorrect computation results due
to physical data corruption, which may help the attacker to deduce the instructions that the
processor is executing, or the internal data state, including the secret key. Another example
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is where the fault attack is applied on DVB Common Scrambling algorithm (CSA). Many
Pay-TV devices in Europe rely on this algorithm to secure the media broadcasting. So, if
an attacker retrieves the secret key used in this algorithm, the attacker is able to listen to
channels without paying [77].
Fault analysis was ﬁrst introduced by Boneh et al. in order to retrieve the private sig-
nature key in the RSA-CRT algorithm [17]. Later, this idea was combined with differential
cryptanalysis by Biham and Shamir where Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) was intro-
duced in [16]. In DFA, the attacker retrieves information about the secret key by utilizing
the difference between the correct and faulty computation results.
While fault analysis attacks may require access to some specialized equipment in order
to be able to insert faults at speciﬁc locations/time, the resulting attack time and memory
complexities are usually far more practical as compared to pure mathematical attacks. Con-
sequently, when a new cipher is proposed, it is important to examine its resistance against
fault analysis. This is particularly important for the case of standardized algorithms given
the potential of wide deployment in different operating environments. The Russian Feder-
ation has been using GOST 28147-89 [38] as the national standard cipher. This standard
was also being used by many other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries
such as Ukraine. Recently, the Russian Federation decided to change their standard cipher
and created a new standard cipher called Kuznyechik [30]. Ukraine decided to change their
standard cipher as well since there were theoretical attacks presented against GOST 28147-
89 and its software implementation was signiﬁcantly slower on modern platforms. Ukraine
chose Kalyna [61], which was the winner of the Ukrainian National Public Cryptographic
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Competition (2007-2010), as their standard block cipher. After Kalyna had been accepted,
its modiﬁed version was made the new standard cipher in Ukraine. Given the importance
of Kuznyechik and Kalyna, in this thesis, we decided to analyze their resistance against
fault analysis attacks.
In addition to block ciphers, it is also important to analyze hash functions for their
resistance against fault analysis attacks when these functions are used as the underlying
primitive for message authentication code (MAC) schemes using secret IV, secret preﬁx,
NMAC or HMAC constructions. The Kupyna hash function [60], is based on the cipher
Kalyna, and has been recently chosen as a standard hash function in Ukraine. In the last
part of this thesis, we investigate the resistance of Kupyna against fault analysis attacks.
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1.2 Contributions
This thesis has three main contributions:
• We show how to apply differential fault analysis on Kuznyechik if everything about
the cipher is known except for the secret key. In particular, we show that the DFA
technique that is applied on AES [62] can also be applied on Kuznyechik, with only
a small modiﬁcation to count for the fact that, unlike AES, the linear transformation
layer in the last round of Kuznyechik is not omitted. According to our analysis, the
key of Kuznyechik can be recovered using an average of four faults. This work was
included in [2].
• We apply differential fault analysis on Kalyna and show that it is more resistant to
the same attack compared to AES and Kuznyechik. We also show how to apply fault
analysis on Kalyna with secret SBoxes and show how the attacker can recover the
SBox entries.
• We apply DFA on the Kupyna hash function when it is used as the underlying primi-
tive for MAC schemes using secret IV, secret preﬁx, NMAC or HMAC constructions.
We also analyze it when it is used with secret SBoxes. According to our analysis,




The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we ﬁrst present general deﬁni-
tions of block ciphers and hash functions. After that, we present a brief literature review of
mathematical attacks and implementation dependent attacks. In Chapter 3, we present our
DFA on Kuznyechik and in Chapter 4, we present our attacks on Kalyna. In Chapter 5, we
present our fault analysis on Kupyna. Finally, in Chapter 6, we present a conclusion and
some suggestions for future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we review the deﬁnition of block ciphers and hash functions. We also brieﬂy
explain some of the most commonly used mathematical attacks against these primitives,
including linear cryptanalysis, differential cryptanalysis, integral cryptanalysis and meet-
in-the-middle attacks. After that, implementation dependent attacks, which include side
channel analysis and fault analysis, are described.
2.1 Deﬁnitions of Cryptographic Primitives
2.1.1 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a function which maps n-bit plaintext blocks to n-bit ciphertext blocks.
The function is parametrized by a k-bit key K, which takes values from a subset κ(the
keyspace) which includes all possible k-bit binary vectors Vk, where it is generally assumed
thatK is chosen at random. An n−bit block cipher is a functionE : Vn×K → Vn, such
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that for each K  κ, E(P,K) is an invertible mapping, the encryption function for K from
Vn to Vn, written as EK(P ). The inverse mapping is the decryption function, denoted as
DK(C). C = EK(P ) denotes that ciphertext C results from encrypting P under K [57].
According to [76], a block cipher is secure if it behaves as a pseudorandom permuta-
tion. In other words, it must be secure against distinguishing attacks: no efﬁcient algorithm,
given interactive access to encryption and decryption black boxes, should be able to distin-
guish the real cipher (i.e., EK andDK) from a truly random permutation. In order to design
a cipher which randomizes a given plaintext in a way that the ciphertext is not distinguish-
able from a random sequence of bits, two properties are introduced by Shannon which are
confusion and diffusion [68]. According to [57], the confusion property is intended to make
the relationship between the key and ciphertext as complex as possible. Diffusion refers to
rearranging or spreading out the bits in the message so that any redundancy in the plaintext
is spread out over the ciphertext. There is no simple function that provides both confusion
and diffusion, so modern ciphers are made of composition of simple functions. The SPN
(Substitution-Permutation Networks) structure is mostly used in modern ciphers, such as
AES [27], where the confusion property is achieved by using substitution boxes and the
diffusion property is satisﬁed using permutation operation and other linear transformations
such as Galois Field multiplication. These operations are applied in many rounds with a
round key mixing at each round to increase the security. In what follows, we deﬁne some
of the building blocks that are used for constructing SPNs.
• Substitution Layer (S): This function is a non-linear bijective mapping between two
vectors. In most ciphers such as AES and Kuznyechik, the substitution layer is built
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by applying byte-to-byte mapping (V8 → V8) to all state bytes. However, in some
other ciphers, the input and the output vectors in the mapping are not of the same size.
As an example, in DES [22], the substitution layer uses eight mappings between 6-
bit binary vectors to 4-bit binary vectors (V6 → V4) that make up the 48-bit binary
state. Since this substituting layer is usually the only non-linear component in the
cipher, weaknesses in substitution boxes can be exploited in many attacks, which
makes their design a very challenging task.
• Permutation Layer (P): This function usually operates on the whole state where it
reorders the bits in the state. In AES, Kuznyechik, Kalyna and Kupyna, reordering is
performed on the byte level.
• Linear Transformation Layer (L): This function either operates on a subset of
bytes in the state or on the whole state where the output of this layer is obtained
by applying a linear transformation over its input. In AES, Kalyna and Kupyna, the
linear transformation is applied column by column. However, in Kuznyechik, the
linear transformation layer is applied to all the state bytes.
Another commonly used block cipher structure is the Feistel network [59]. A Feistel
cipher is an iterated cipher mapping of a 2t-bit plaintext (L0, R0), for t − bit blocks L0
and R0, to a ciphertext (Rr, Lr), through an r-round process. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, round i
maps (L(i−1), R(i−1)) → (Li, Ri) as follows: Li = R(i−1), Ri = L(i−1) ⊕ f(R(i−1), Ki),
where each subkey Ki is derived from the cipher key K. The f function of the Feistel
cipher may be a product cipher, though f itself need not be invertible to allow inversion of
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the Feistel cipher. Decryption is thereby achieved by using the same r-round process but
with subkeys used in the reverse order, Kr through K1 [57]. DES, which was adopted as a
national standard in the United States in 1977 [22] is an example of a block cipher which
was designed as a Feistel Network.
The key addition (X) is also a part of the round operations in both SPN and Feistel
structures. In order to perform key addition, ﬁrstly, the round keys for each round are
calculated using the input key given by the user. This process is called key scheduling.
The addition of round keys to the current state in each round is called key mixing. The
key mixing is crucial to the security of the cipher since it adds randomization. If there was
no key mixing, the attacker would be able to ﬁnd the inverse of encryption function used.
According to Kerckhoffs’s Principle, the attacker knows everything about the cipher except
the secret key [47].
Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the round functions in both SPN and Feistel Net-
works.
2.1.2 Hash Functions
Hash functions are used to construct short ﬁngerprints of some data. If the data changes,
the ﬁngerprint also changes [72]. According to [57], a hash function H is a function which
has at least the following two properties:
1. Compression: H maps an input x of an arbitrary ﬁnite bit length to an output H(x) of
ﬁnite bit length n.
2. Ease of computation: Given H and input x, H(x) is easy to compute.
14
Figure 1: Round function for round i in Feistel Network and SPN
In addition to the above two basic properties, cryptographic hash functions also need to
satisfy the following three properties:
• One wayness: Given a message M , calculating H(M) should be easy but given
H(M), calculating M should be hard.
• Strong Collision Resistance: It should be computationally infeasible to ﬁnd any two
messages, M,M ′, such that M = M ′ but H(M) = H(M ′).
• Weak Collision Resistance: Given a message M , it is computationally infeasible
to ﬁnd another message M ′ such that M = M ′ but H(M) = H(M ′). If a hash
function is not weak collision resistant, then it is not strong collision resistant but the
opposite is not true.
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2.2 Attacks on Cryptographic Primitives
2.2.1 Mathematical Attacks
2.2.1.1 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack which was ﬁrst applied on DES by Matsui
[54]. The goal is to get a linear approximation for a given cipher algorithm. In order to
achieve this, a statistical linear path between input and output bits of each SBox in the
cipher is constructed. More formally, the purpose is to ﬁnd an effective linear expression
for a given cipher algorithm [54] such that:
P [i1, i2, ..., ia] ⊕ C[j1, j2, ..., jb] = K[k1, k2, ..., kc] (1)
holds with probability p = 1
2
, where i1, i2, · · · , ia, j1, j2, · · · , jb, k1, k2, · · · , kc denote
ﬁxed bit locations in the equation 1. The magnitude of equation 1 is calculated as | p − 1
2
|
and it deﬁnes the effectiveness of the approximation. The goal here is to ﬁnd the subset of
bits that maximizes the magnitude of Equation 1.
Matsui [54] showed that 8-round DES can be broken using 221 known plaintexts and
the full DES can be broken using 247 known plaintexts. Since its introduction, linear crypt-
analysis has been applied on many other ciphers (e.g., see [55], [36], [53]).
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2.2.1.2 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack where the attacker exploits the high
probability of certain occurrences of plaintext differences and differences into the last round
of the cipher [41]. In linear cryptanalysis, ﬁnding a linear approximation to the cipher al-
gorithm was achieved by ﬁnding linear approximations to the underlying nonlinear com-
ponents. However, in differential cryptanalysis, the goal is to ﬁnd the probability that a
ciphertext difference (Δ C = C ⊕ C ′) occurs given a plaintext difference has occurred
(Δ P = P ⊕ P ′), where C = EK(P ) and C ′ = EK(P ′). For an ideal cipher, this prob-
ability should be Δ Y = (1
2
)
n where n is the block length [41]. Differential cryptanalysis
ﬁnds the scenarios where ΔC occurs with a high probability given that a particular ΔP has
occurred. We call the pair (Δ P,Δ C) a differential. Similar to linear cryptanalysis, differ-
ential cryptanalysis analyzes properties of individual SBoxes. As an example, consider the
SBox entries used in DES (DES has many SBoxes, we chose ﬁrst row of its ﬁrst SBox),
given in Table 1:
Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
Output E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7
Table 1: SBoxes used in DES
Here, for the input difference to the SBox, Δx = 0x0B, the probability that Δy = 2 is
8
16
. This is the difference with the highest probability. Also, note that key addition before
the substitution layer has no effect on the difference because of the simple mathematical
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property of the XOR function. Let K be the round key after the substitution layer. In
that case, inputs to SBoxes become (P ⊕ K) and (P ′ ⊕ K) and the input difference is
Δ = P ⊕K ⊕ P ′ ⊕K = P ⊕ P ′ which is equal to Δ P .
Differential cryptanalysis was ﬁrst applied on DES by Biham and Shamir [15] where
they showed that they are able to break any reduced round variant of DES (up to 15 rounds)
using less than 256 chosen plaintexts. They also showed that differential cryptanalysis can
be applied on any kind of DES-like ciphers. By taking the fact that DES can be broken
using linear and differential cryptanalysis, resistance against those attacks was taken as an
important element among design criteria for AES [26]. On October 2000, NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) chose AES, which replaced DES, as the standard
block cipher for the United States [32].
In [13], Biham et al. introduced impossible differential cryptanalysis. Unlike the clas-
sical differential cryptanalysis which aims to ﬁnd differentials that occur with high proba-
bility, this attack is based on ﬁnding differences with 0 probability, i.e., differences that are
impossible to occur and use them to exclude wrong key guesses during the analysis phase
of the attack.
2.2.1.3 Integral Cryptanalysis
After linear and differential cryptanalysis were proposed, a new block cipher, which was
resistant to those attacks, was designed by Knudsen et al. This block cipher was called
SQUARE [25]. For resistance against linear and differential cryptanalysis, they used a de-
sign strategy called wide trail design strategy [24] for SBoxes and linear transformation
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layer. In this design strategy, SBoxes were chosen where the maximum difference propa-
gation probability and the maximum input-output correlation were as small as possible. In
addition to the design of the new cipher, Knudsen et al. also suggested an attack on that
cipher. This attack was called integral cryptanalysis. It is also known as the Square attack
since it was ﬁrst applied on the cipher SQUARE. Integral cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext
attack where the attacker chooses a set of plaintexts which are the same in some bytes and
different in some other bytes. Bytes that are same in all plaintexts are called passive bytes
and bytes that differ among plaintexts are called active bytes. In this attack, the cryptana-
lyst changes the active bytes across all possible byte values and analyzes results. Knudsen
et al. showed that 4-round SQUARE can be broken using 29 chosen plaintexts and 6-round
SQUARE can be broken using 232 chosen plaintexts [25]. Integral cryptanalysis was also
applied on other ciphers such as HIEROCRYPT [9], IDEA [14], CAMELLIA [78], Skip-
jack [44], MISTY1 [73], SAFER++ [63], and KHAZAD [58].
2.2.1.4 Meet-in-the-middle Attacks
The meet-in-the-middle attack was ﬁrst introduced by Difﬁe and Helman in [29]. In the
basic form of this attack, the attacker tries to split the cipher into two parts where one is
used in the encryption direction and the other is used in the decryption direction. Then,
the attacker partially guesses key bits from both ends and propagates her knowledge of the
internal state of the cipher until the information propagated in both directions meet in the
middle for matching. The key bits are considered wrong if no match is found. Otherwise,
the key bits may be a key candidate.
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Many variants of meet-in-the-middle attacks were recently proposed. For example,
Dunkelman et al. [31] presented a meet-in-the-middle attack on reduced round DES. In
this attack, rather than guessing the key bits, they guess intermediate encryption values
which reduced the time complexity of the attack. The attack was applied on 4-round DES,
5-round DES and 6-round DES. One of the most important meet-in-the-middle attacks in
the literature is the one applied on AES by Demirci and Selcuk [28] where they showed
that if the truncated differential for 4-round distinguisher has only one active byte that takes
all possible values, then the output byte can be evaluated using a function of 25 parame-
ters. Their attack was applied on AES-256 with 7 rounds. Furthermore, they were able
to reduce time complexity of the attack using a high-memory to store the pre-computation
table [1] which was computed ofﬂine. A similar meet-in-the-middle attack was applied
on Kuznyechik by Altawy and Youssef [3]. In their attack, they used the differential enu-
meration approach where they proposed a distinguisher for the middle rounds and matched
the sequence of state differences at the output. They showed that for 5-round reduced ci-
pher, 256-bit master key of Kuznyechik can be recovered with a time complexity of 2140.3, a
memory complexity of 2153.3, and a data complexity of 2113. Variants of meet-in-the-middle
attacks were also applied on hash functions (e.g., see [43], [65]).
2.2.2 Implementation Dependent Attacks
2.2.2.1 Side Channel Analysis
Side channel analysis refers to analyzing side channel information of the device during the
computation. In what follows, we brieﬂy review some examples of side channel attacks:
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• Timing Attacks: Timing attacks were ﬁrst introduced by Kocher [50]. These attacks
exploit the fact that cryptosystems take different amounts of time to process different
inputs. As an example, the RSA [64] cryptosystem includes modular exponentiation
operations C = M e mod n, M = Cd mod n, where e is the public key and
d is the private key. When using the square and multiply algorithm to perform the
exponentiation operation, if the bit in the binary representation of the exponent is 1, a
multiplication operation is performed. However, if this bit is zero, no multiplication
is performed. This means that, if the key bit is 1, it takes longer processing time. Thus
observing the time required to perform the decryption operation allows the attacker
to ﬁnd how many bits in the key are equal to 1. However, learning how many bits
of the key are 1 does not allow the attacker to recover the whole key directly. So,
the attacker also uses statistical information based on many encryption/decryption
operations in order to get more information about the key.
Another timing attack was performed by Brumley and Boneh on SSL [19]. Their
attack was able to retrieve the private key used in OpenSSL based web server running
on a machine on the local network.
Another timing attack is the cache timing attack performed on AES by Bernstein
[12]. In this attack, the attacker exploits the fact that different SBox entries take
different amounts of time in SBox lookup operations. The attacker observes the
cases where the SBox lookup operation gives maximum timing and guesses key bits
accordingly. To summarize, timing attacks can still be applied on many ciphers and
they need to be taken into account while designing and implementing new ciphers.
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• Differential Power Analysis: In differential power analysis, the attacker aims to get
information about secrets in a device, such as keys, using the power usage informa-
tion of the device. Similar to the timing attack, this attack is also non-invasive, which
means that the attacker does not change anything during the calculations performed
by the device. Power analysis was ﬁrst introduced by Kocher et al. [49] who applied
it to hardware implementations of DES. Differential power analysis requires observ-
ing many encryption/decryption operations and capturing the corresponding power
traces. In order to prevent differential power analysis, Kocher et al. [49] suggested
three different techniques which are reducing signal sizes so that the attacker is not
able to get information about the secret key from looking at the power usage, intro-
ducing noise to power consumption so that the attacker needs to take more samples
for getting information about the secret key using power usage analysis, and the last
approach is to design the device by making realistic assumptions about the hardware.
In [67], Shamir proposed a solution to differential power analysis by decorrelating the
external power supplied to the device from the internal power used by the chip. Since
this attack may allow an attacker to get secret information from devices without be-
ing detected, it is important to check newly designed devices against their resistance
to power analysis. This is especially true for devices processing critical information
such as credit card readers.
• Acoustics Cryptanalysis: In acoustics cryptanalysis, the attacker uses the sound
emitted by the device to gain information about the secret key. This idea was applied
on RSA in [35] where Genkin et al. were able to recover 4096-bits RSA private
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key within an hour by placing a high sensitive microphone close to the computer
performing the decryption. They distinguish operations performed by the CPU ac-
cording to the sound waveforms. In order to mitigate such analysis, they suggested
acoustic shielding where sound signals are absorbed by the shield. Another solution
was to use noisy environment where the noise is generated in a way that it cannot
be distinguished from the noise generated by the CPU. This attack shows that many
different side channels can be found by the attackers.
• Cold Boot Attack: A cold-boot attack is a SCA that exploits the fact that data loss
of a non-powered random access memory can be retarded by cooling it down [39].
In 2002, Skorobogatov performed experiments to study the temperature dependency
of data retention time in static RAM devices [70]. The reported results indicated
that many chips may preserve data for relatively long periods of time at temperatures
above −20◦C which contradicted the common wisdom that was widely believed at
that time. Thus, one way to launch a cold-boot attack is to remove the memory
module, after cooling it, from the target system and immediately plug it in another
system under the adversary’s control. This system is then booted to access the mem-
ory. Further analysis can then be performed against the information that is retrieved
from memory in order to ﬁnd sensitive information such as cryptographic keys or
passwords. For example, Halderman et al. have developed a recovery algorithm for




All the implementation dependent attacks we have mentioned earlier in this chapter are
non-invasive since the attacker does not change anything during the computation. How-
ever, fault analysis is invasive since it requires the attacker to intervene the computation by
inserting faults. Fault analysis was ﬁrst introduced by Boneh et al. [17] where the private
signing key of RSA-CRT algorithm was obtained using a correct signature and a faulty
signature for the same message. Later, this idea was combined with differential cryptanal-
ysis by Biham and Shamir where differential fault analysis was ﬁrst applied on DES [16].
Biham and Shamir claim that even though smart cards are tamper-resistant, meaning that
even the owner of the smart card cannot get secrets out of it, they are easy to attack due
to their simplicity. In the fault model described in [16] by Biham and Shamir, one fault is
introduced in each encryption/decryption and the fault changes one bit in the register either
from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. The attacker encrypts a known plaintext twice and if resulting
ciphertexts are different, the attacker knows that a fault has occurred and can also identify
the round where the fault has occurred. If the fault has occurred in the last round, it gives
information on bits of the last round key.
Fault injection can be performed using power glitches, tampering with the clock pulses
or injecting laser beams [23, 71].
Differential fault analysis (DFA) attacks vary greatly in terms of number of faults re-
quired and the way the attacker is able to inject faults. Faults attacks were applied on many
ciphers such as AES. In the fault attack applied on AES [62] by Piret and Quisquater, the
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attacker faults the input to substitution layer in the round before the last one and the at-
tacker faults the state by changing one of the state bytes to a random value. Depending on
the byte faulted by the attacker, the attacker is able to retrieve a set of bytes for the last
round key. So, in this fault model, the attacker knows that the fault occurs in which state
of the computation but the attacker does not have control over which byte to fault. So, this
is called a random fault model. Also, the attacker may apply the same fault twice which
will lead to gaining no additional information. In another fault attack applied on AES by
Ghalaty et al. [37], the attacker is assumed to know which state the fault has occurred and
the way the attacker applies the fault is by ﬂipping bits from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. Also,
the attacker is able to deﬁne the fault intensity, which is number of bits in a state byte that
can be ﬂipped. The attacker does not exactly know which byte has been faulted but the
attacker can know that information by analyzing the correct and faulty ciphertexts. This
fault attack requires many more faults compared to the attack presented in [62], however,
it did not involve complex calculations. In both of these attacks, it was assumed that the
attacker knows everything about the cipher except the secret key. This includes values of
SBoxes, the permutation function and constants for the linear transformation matrix. How-
ever, this may not always be the case. A novel fault attack was applied on AES by Clavier
and Wurcker [21] which assumes that the attacker does not know anything except the way
the algorithm works. So, in their attack, they assumed that the attacker does not know the
SBox entries, the permutation function and linear transformation constants. The attacker
just knows these functions are applied but she does not know exactly how. In their fault
model, faults were applied by forcing a speciﬁc SBox output to 0. So, in that case, the
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attacker knows which byte has been faulted and also knows the state fault has been applied.
They showed that fault analysis can still be applied on AES even when the security through
obscurity is used.
In [74], Tunstall et al. applied fault attack on AES which consisted of a single random
byte fault applied on the input to eight round. After the fault, they used a two-stage algo-
rithm. In the ﬁrst stage, they reduced the possible set of keys from 2128 to 232 and in the
second stage, they were able to reduce the number of possible keys to 28. In some cases,
they ended up with only 2 possible keys. Fuhr et al. applied fault attack on AES using
faulty ciphertexts only [33]. Their attack was applied on AES-128 using nonuniform fault
models. It targeted last 4 rounds and it was able to recover user given key using a limited
number of faulty ciphertexts only. This means that the attacker does not have to know the
correct plaintext and the correct ciphertext for applying the attack. Battistello and Giraud
showed that it is still possible to apply fault attack on AES even when infective computation
countermeasure is applied [10]. They showed that it is very difﬁcult to design an effective
countermeasure for AES against fault attacks.
Fault attacks were also applied on other cryptographic functions (ciphers and hash func-
tions) such as APE [7], MULTI2 [8], SHACAL-1 [52], and Streebog [4]. In the fault attack
applied on APE, Saha et al. showed how diagonal fault attack can be applied on APE [7]
and how the key candidates can be reduced from 2160 to 225. In the fault attack applied
on MULTI2, which is a cipher used in Japan to secure media broadcasting, Aumasson et
al. [8] were able to recover the secret key uniquely for any number of rounds. In the fault
attack applied on SHACAL-1, Li et al. [52] showed that 72 random faults are needed to
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recover 512-bit key successfully with probability 60%. Korkikian et al. applied blind fault
attack on ciphers with SPN structure [51]. In their attack, they injected faults to the last
round of the cipher and applied statistical method on pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts
to retrieve the key. They showed that fault attacks are possible even when the input and out-
put messages to the cipher are not known. Their attack required so many faults which was
the price to pay for blindness. As an example, 480000 faults were needed to completely
recover AES key. Lastly, in the fault attack applied on the Streebog hash function, Altawy
and Youssef [4] showed that secret inputs to the Streebog hash function, when used to build
a MAC scheme, can be retrieved using fault analysis. They used three different fault mod-
els, namely, random byte fault model, known byte random fault model and known byte
unique fault model. In the random byte fault model, the attacker does not know which byte
has been faulted. In the known byte random fault model, the attacker knows which byte
has been faulted but this fault may have been applied before, i.e., uniqueness of faults is
not ensured by the fault injection procedure. In the known byte unique fault model, the
attacker knows which byte has been faulted and she is sure that same fault is not applied
twice.
2.3 Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks
Since fault attacks may allow attackers to retrieve the secret key from the cryptographic
device, it is important to protect cryptographic devices against those attacks. In [46], Joye
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and Tunstall categorize prevention techniques under three categories which are modular-
redundancy, patches, and protocol-based. Modular redundancy is basically achieved by
executing the algorithm several times with same inputs to see if outputs are different.
Protocol-based solutions contain randomizing the key or the plaintext. As an example,
in All-Or-Nothing transform [56], a message is randomized and the random message is
encrypted in order to prevent the adversary from gaining information about the original
message using fault analysis. There are also general methods which can be applied on any
algorithm such as detection of changes or masking.
In order to attack a device, an adversary may reduce the number of rounds [20] since
this makes the cipher easier to attack. In order to detect this attack, a second invariant is
used which counts backwards from the total number of rounds or a signature can be added
to a loop counter which is updated at each iteration.
Another way the adversary can attack a cryptographic device is by modifying the non-
volatile parts of the device such as the secret key [6] or SBox entries [66]. This can be
prevented using cyclic redundancy check which checks if data has been tampered.
Masking refers to adding random delays during the calculation. This does not prevent
the adversary from injecting faults but it makes the job of the adversary more difﬁcult.
However, in [18], Boscherand and Handschuh showed that masking does not totally pre-
vent against fault attacks. They were able to recover secret keys from two masked AES




Kuznyechik is an SPN block cipher that has been chosen recently to be standardized by the
Russian Federation as a new GOST cipher. In this chapter, we present a differential fault
attack against Kuznyechik. Our attack employs the random byte fault model, where the
attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random byte in rounds seven and eight. Using this
fault model enables the attacker to recover the master key using an average of four faults.
The presented attack has a practical complexity and aims to demonstrate the importance of
protecting the hardware and software implementations of the new standard.
3.1 Speciﬁcation of Kuznyechik
Kuznyechik operates on 128-bits state [30, 69]. It gets a 256-bits key input from the user.
This key, called the master key, is used to generate 10 sub-round keys (K1, K2, · · · , K10)
with 128-bits each. The encryption procedure updates the 128-bits state by iterating the
29
round function 9 times as shown in Figure 2. The round function consists of the following
operations:
• SubBytes (S): This is a nonlinear bijective mapping and it works on the byte level.
• LinearTransformation (L): This is the diffusion layer which operates on 128 bits (16
bytes). It can be seen as a row left multiplication by a 16× 16 byte (MDS) matrix.
• KeyAddition(X): This operation mixes the round key with the state bytes. Key mix-
ing is done by a bitwise XOR operation.
Figure 2: Encryption procedure of Kuznyechik [2]
There is an XOR operation with the round key K1 in the beginning of the encryption.
Here is the description of encryption operation where C is the ciphertext and P is the
plaintext:
C = (X[K10] ◦ L ◦ S) ◦ · · · ◦ (X[K2] ◦ L ◦ S) ◦X[K1](P ) (2)
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The ﬁrst two sub-round keys, K1 and K2, are derived directly from the master key
where K1 is the left half of the master key and K2 is the right half of the master key, i.e.,
K = K1 ‖ K2 where K is the 256-bits master key and ‖ denotes the concatenation
operation. The other round keys are derived according to the following transformation:
(K2i+1, K2i+2) = F [C8(i−1)+8] ◦ · · · ◦ F [C8(i−1)+1](K2i−1, K2i), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, (3)
where Ci = L(i), i = 1, 2, · · · , 32 and F [C](a, b) denotes (LSX[C](a) ⊕ b, a).
Figure 3 shows the key schedule of Kuznyechik which is basically a Feistel Network where
the round constants (Ci) are used instead of the round keys. The following notation will
be used throughout the rest of the chapter to explain the fault attack we performed on
Kuznyechik:
• xi, yi, zi: The 16-byte state in the correct computation after the X , S, L operations,
respectively, at round i.
• x′i, y′i, z′i: The 16-byte state in the faulty computation after the X , S, L operation,
respectively, at round i.
• xi[j]: The jth byte of the state xi, where j = 0, 1, · · · , 15, and the bytes are indexed
from left to right.
• (C,C ′): A pair of ciphertexts where C denotes the original ciphertext and C ′ denotes
the faulty ciphertext.
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• P [j]: The jth byte of the plaintext.
Figure 3: Key schedule of Kuznyechik [2]
3.2 Differential Fault Analysis on Kuznyechik
In this attack, we adopt the random byte fault model where the attacker is able to fault a
random byte in the output of x8 or y8. The fault insertion is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Fault injection in round 8 of Kuznyechik [2]
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In order to launch the attack, the attacker builds a table of all possible differences in z8
as the ﬁrst step. This table contains 16×255 entries since there are 16 bytes in the state and
255 possible differences for a given byte. After that, using the observed pair (C,C ′), the at-
tacker guesses set of bytes for the last round key and evaluates the state difference between
the correct and the faulty computation as (x9⊕x′9). Then, the attacker checks the evaluated
difference with the set of differences stored in the table. If there is a match, it means that set
of bytes guessed by the attacker are candidate bytes. In our experiment, we used an array of
16 linked lists for candidate bytes where each linked list contains candidate bytes for each
byte position. According to [62], the expected number of remaining candidate keys after
analyzing N candidate pairs of (C,C ′) is given by 256n(n× 2551−n)N , where n is number
of bytes in the state. So, for the case of Kuzneychik, the number of candidate pairs after
applyingN faults is 25616(16×255−15)N . From this equation, we are able to claim that two
pairs are required to guess the last round key uniquely. However, this implementation of
the attack requires guessing the 128-bits of the last round key when testing the ﬁrst correct
and faulty ciphertext pair. This fact makes this attack not practical. If the last round did
not contain linear transformation layer (L), the attacker would be able to guess key bytes
independently. This reduces the complexity as in AES and Khazad [62]. In Kuznyechik,
the linear transformation operation is not omitted from the last round. This fact makes at-
tacking Kuznyechik a bit trickier. In our attack, we used an equivalent representation of the
last round by replacing the order of the key addition operation and the linear transformation
operation. Since they are both linear, their order can be replaced. Figure 4 shows our attack
and the equivalent representation where the order of linear transformation and key mixing
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have changed. We also use an equivalent key in this equivalent representation which is
EK10 = L
−1(K10). This equivalent representation makes the fault attack practical. Here
is the algorithmic description of the attack:
Algorithm 1 Differential fault analysis on Kuzneychik
1: Store all possible differences at the output of z8 which result from a change in one byte
value into a table T . This table contains 16× 255 entries.
2: Initialize Y as an array of linked lists which contains candidates for each byte index.
We refer to candidates for byte i as Y [i], i = 0 · · · 15
3: Consider two correct and faulty ciphertext pairs (C1, C ′1), and (C2, C
′
2). For each pair,
compute ECi = L−1(Ci), and EC ′i = L
−1(C ′i), for i = 1, 2.
4: for all 216 values of EK10[0]||EK10[1] do
5: Calculate the following two differences Δ0 and Δ1:
6: Δ0 = S
−1(X[EK10[0]||EK10[1]](EC1[0]||EC1[1])) ⊕
S−1(X[EK10[0]||EK10[1]](EC ′1[0]||EC ′1[1]))
7: Δ1 = S
−1(X[EK10[0]||EK10[1]](EC2[0]||EC2[1])) ⊕
S−1(X[EK10[0]||EK10[1]](EC ′2[0]||EC ′2[1]))
8: Match these two differences with two leftmost bytes of differences in set T .
9: if There is a match then
10: Add candidate EK10[0] to Y [0]
11: Add candidate EK10[1] to Y [1]
12: end if
13: end for
14: for all Elements in Y [1] do
15: Remove EK10[1] from Y [1] and extend it by one byte EK10[2].
16: for all 28 values of EK10[2] do
17: Compute the following two differences Δ1 and Δ2:
18: Δ1 = S
−1(X[EK10[1]||EK10[2]](EC1[1]||EC1[2])) ⊕
S−1(X[EK10[1]||EK10[2]](EC ′1[1]||EC ′1[2]))
19: Δ2 = S
−1(X[EK10[1]||EK10[2]](EC2[1]||EC2[2])) ⊕
S−1(X[EK10[1]||EK10[2]](EC ′2[1]||EC ′2[2]))
20: Match these two differences with bytes at indices 1 and 2 in set T .
21: if There is a match then
22: Add candidate EK10[1] to Y [1]





27: Repeat the above procedure starting in line 14 two bytes at a time until bytes 14 and
15.
28: Y contains candidates for each byte index for EK10. Find candidates for K10 using
candidates for EK10 by calculating L(EK10) = K10.
We have simulated this attack for the recovery of the last round key (K10) using 100
randomly generated user keys. Using two faults resulted in an average of 462.86 candidates
for the last round key K10. After that, these remaining candidates were exhaustively tested
using the same pairs for correct and faulty ciphertexts, in order to uniquely recover K10.
After ﬁnding K10, one can peel off the last round and apply the same attack to recover K9
by inserting two faults in either x7 or y7. Finally, all the round keys can be recovered using
K9 and K10, which allows us to ﬁnd the 256-bit key (K1||K2).
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented differential fault analysis attack on the Russian encryp-
tion standard, Kuznyechik. Our attack starts by employing an equivalent representation of
the last round by changing the order of the two linear operations which are key mixing and
linear transformation. This is done to bypass the effect of the optimal diffusion layer in
order to make the attack practical. Using this attack, we are able to recover the master key
using about 4 faults where two faults are used for recovering K10 and two other faults are




Ukraine chose Kalyna [61], which was the winner of the Ukrainian National Public Cryp-
tographic Competition (2007-2010), as their standard block cipher. After Kalyna was ac-
cepted, its modiﬁed version was made the new standard cipher in Ukraine. In this chapter,
we analyze the resistance of Kalyna against fault analysis attacks.
4.1 Speciﬁcation of Kalyna
4.1.1 Encryption
The Kalyna block cipher is deﬁned using two parameters which are the input plaintext
block length and the key length. In this chapter, we use Kalynal-k to denote Kalyna with
a plaintext block of length l and a user key of size k bits. According to the standard [61],
Kalyna has 5 possible combinations of l and k, which are Kalyna128-128, Kalyna128-
256, Kalyna256-256, Kalyna256-512, and Kalyna512-512. Similar to AES, the Kalyna
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encryption process can be described using a state matrix. The number of rows in the state
matrix is always 8 since Kalyna was designed to be compatible with 64-bit architectures.
The block length l determines the number of columns c in the state matrix and the key
length determines the number of rounds(r) as shown in Table 2.






Table 2: Number of columns(c) and number of rounds(r) based on l, r in Kalyna
The encryption function consists of the following operations which operate on the l-bit
state (see Figure 5):
• ηKi : Modulo 264 addition of the round key Ki to the state in little-endian.
• π: Nonlinear bijective mapping of state bytes. There are 4 different SBoxes which
are S0, S1, S2, S3. If the current state is presented as (8× c) matrix M , each element
of M , i.e., Mi,j where i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 7 and j = 0, 1, 2, · · · (c − 1), is mapped to a
byte value using the substitution box Si mod 4.
• τ : In this operation, each element of M is circularly right shifted on row i by γi
bytes where γi is calculated according to the formula γi = 	 i×l512
. As an example, if
Kalyna128-128 is used, row number 4 is circularly right shifted by 	4×128
512

 = 1 byte.
• ψ: Refers to liner transformation of each column over the ﬁnite ﬁeld where it operates
on each column. The ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (28) is formed using the irreducible polynomial
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γx = x
8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1. If Mj refers to column j of current state, then each
element of he new state is calculated as:
M
′
i,j = (υ≫ i)⊗Mj
where υ = (0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01, 0x08, 0x06, 0x07, 0x04) and ⊗ refers to scalar
product of two vectors over the ﬁnite ﬁeld. υ ≫ i refers to circular right shift of
vector υ with i positions to right.
• μKi : Modulo 2 addition (⊕) of the round key Ki to the state.
The inverses of the above functions are denoted by η−1, π−1, τ−1, and ψ−1, respectively.
The encryption function is deﬁned as:
EK(M) = (η
Kr ◦ ψ ◦ τ ◦ π ◦ (
r−1∏
i=1
(μKi ◦ ψ ◦ τ ◦ π )) ◦ ηK0)(M)
Figure 5 shows how encryption function works for Kalyna.
4.1.2 Key Scheduling
Firstly, a temporary key (KT ) is calculated from the user key (K) according to the following
formula:
KT = (ψ ◦ τ ◦ π ◦ ηKα ◦ ψ ◦ τ ◦ π ◦ μK ◦ ψ ◦ τ ◦ π ◦ ηKα)(Kρ)
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Figure 5: Kalyna encryption function
where Kρ is l bit value which is calculated as
(l+k+64)
64
in little-endian. The functions
ψ, τ, π, η, μ are the same functions as the ones used in the encryption operation.
When the key size is the same as the block size, i.e. when k = l, we have:
Kα = K = K
When key size is double the block size, i.e., k = 2× l, we have Kα is the left half of K
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and K is the right half of K. In other words:
K = Kα || K
After ﬁnding KT , the round keys with even indices ( i  0, 2, 4, 6, · · ·) are calculated
according to the following formula:
Ξ(KT , i) = (η
ϕ
KT
i ◦ ψ ◦ τ ◦ π ◦ μϕKTi ◦ ψ ◦ τ ◦ π ◦ ηϕKTi )(Kγ)
where ϕKTi = η
KT (ϑ  (i/2)) which is KT added modulo 264 with the constant
ϑ shifted left by index i divided by 2. The constant ϑ is a sequence of bits of length l
which is 01((0001)7×(c−1))00. Here the notation ((0001)7×(c−1)) means that the bit se-
quence 0001 is repeated 7 × (c− 1) times. As an example, for Kalyna128-128, we have
ϑ = 01000100010001000100010001000100. Kγ is calculated according to the user input
key K. If the block size and key size are the same, then Kγ = K≫ (32 × i). If the key
size is double of the block size, then Kγ = K≫ (16 × i) for even indices divisible by 4
i{0, 4, 8, 12, ...}. For indices not divisible by 4, Kγ = K≫ (64× 	(i/4)
).
After generating the round keys with even indices, the round keys with odd indices
are generated from their predecessor round key as Ki = Ki−1 ≪ ((l/4) + 24) where
i{1, 3, 5, 7, · · · } and l is the size of internal cipher state in bits. Thus, the round keys with
even indices are linearly dependent on their successor only and the round keys with odd
indices are linearly dependent on their predecessor only. For example, in Kalyna128-128,
there are 11 round keys which are K0, K1, · · · , K10. K0 and K1 are linearly dependent on
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each other but K1 and K2 have no linear dependency. So, an attacker has to recover all the
round keys with even indices or all the round keys with odd indices in order to break the
cipher.
Notation : The following notation is used throughout this chapter:
• wi: State after addition of round key Ki, this key addition can be either η or μ.
• xi: State after the π operation at round i.
• yi: State after the τ operation at round i.
• zi: State after the ψ operation at round i.
• For states in faulty computation, we use w′i, x′i, y′i, z′i
• wi[j][k]: If the state is represented as a matrix with 8 rows and c columns, wi[j][k]
refers to row number j and column number k of state wi. Similar notation is used for
other states.
• Wi[j]: If the state is considered as a sequence of bytes rather than a matrix, we use the
upper case notation. Wi[j] refers to byte index j where j{0, 1, 2, ..., (	(l/8)
 − 1)}
and bytes are numbered from left to right. Also, in order to convert a byte index
to a matrix element, 	( j
8
)
 gives us column number and 	 j mod 8 
 gives us the
row number, so Wi[j] = wi[j mod 8][	 j8
]. Figure 6 shows how the state bytes are
numbered for each block size l if the state is considered as a sequence of bytes rather
than a matrix.
• WL : Refers to the left half of the state W .
41
• WR : Refers to the right half of the state W .
• Δxi,xj : Difference between two states xi and xj .
• (C,C ′) : A pair of ciphertexts where C is the correct ciphertext and C ′ is the faulty
ciphertext.
• P [j] : Byte j of plaintext where bytes are numbered as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Kalyna state bytes with their indices
4.2 Fault Analysis on Kalyna with Known SBoxes
In this attack, the attacker is able to change a byte value in the state to a random value but
the attacker does not know which byte has been changed. Attacker only knows where that
change happens. In other words, the random fault model is applied here. Propagation of
the injected fault depends on the operations applied to the state after the fault. Figure 7
shows how a fault applied at w9 propagates in the last round for Kalyna128-128. As shown
in the ﬁgure, if a fault appears at the input to π or τ operations, they affect only one byte
of the next state. However, if a fault appears at the input of the ψ operation, it affects the
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whole column. During our attacks, a fault can happen in the input of π, τ or ψ, which will
have the same effect in terms of propagation of the fault.
Figure 7: Fault propogation if a fault appears in input to π in the last round in Kalyna128-
128
The ﬁrst step in this attack is to build a lookup table with the possible set of differences
after the ψ operation. This table, λ, has 8× 255 entries since there are 8 possible places in
one column where a change can happen and the inserted fault takes any value from 0x01
to 0xFF .
The second step is to recover the last round key. In order to do that, the attacker faults
the computation at the input to the last π operation at round 10 (e.g., w9 in Kalyna128-
128). Based on the byte index where the fault occurs, the faulty ciphertext differs from the
correct ciphertext only in one column since the fault changes only one column. Then, the
attacker recovers the bytes of the key in that column by analyzing (C,C ′) pairs. In order to
recover the last round key, the fault is applied to the last round. In order to recover the last
round key fully, the attacker has to recover each column of the key. However, no matter
how many faults are applied, there will be two candidates for the most signiﬁcant byte in
43
each column which differ only in one bit since the modulo 264 addition may or may not
generate a carry [52]. In other words, in our attack, we are not able to recover the most
signiﬁcant bit of the most signiﬁcant byte of the key. Hence, we get two candidates for the
most signiﬁcant byte.
After recovering the key candidates for the last round, the attacker also needs to re-
cover the intermediate round keys in order to break the cipher. In order to do so, all sub-
sequent rounds have to be peeled. Also, there is a difference between recovery of the
last round key and recovery of the intermediate round keys (Ki) for each round i where
i  {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, · · · (r − 1)} . In order to recover an intermediate round key, the at-
tacker has to fault π input to the round before that round. This means that, if the attacker
wants to recover the round key at round i, the fault has to be applied at the SBox input at
round i− 1, which refers to state w(i−2). This is because all the intermediate key additions
are Modulo 2 addition (XOR) and XOR function is also used to calculate the differences.
The intermediate round keys are recovered column by column similar to the last round key.
The only difference is that, for the intermediate round keys, we should end up with only
one candidate if we applied enough number of faults since there is no carry propagation as
in the last round key. According to the formula applied to Kuznyechik, in order to estimate
the number of faults needed to recover the last round key [62], we are able to retrieve each
column of the key by applying two faults.
Unlike AES [27] and Kuznyechik [30], we recover the round keys column by column
rather than recovering the whole round key and we merge these candidates for each column.
We are not able to recover the whole round key in one iteration since we have Modulo
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264 addition for the last round key which affects one column in the ciphertext and for
intermediate round keys, the difference after the ﬁrst ψ operation after fault is one column
as well. As an example, in Kalyna128-128, if the fault occurs in one of byte with index
∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15}, the fault propagates to the ﬁrst column and the attacker is able
to retrieve information about the ﬁrst column of the key. If the fault occurs in one of the
byte with indices in {8, 9, 10, 11, 4, 5, 6, 7}, the fault propagates to the second column and
the attacker is able to retrieve information about the second column of the key. In our
attack, we use the same approach we used for Kuznyechik [2], however instead of guessing
two bytes at a time, we merged one byte to our previous guess at each step and we ended up
guessing the whole column of the key we are trying to recover. This was an improvement
to the previous attack.
The following algorithm (algorithm 2) gives step by step description of the recovery of
column j of the round key for round i. For simplicity, we assume that all faults propagate
to column j and we denote column j of the correct ciphertext as Cj and column j of the
faulty ciphertext as C ′j . M [i, j] refers to slice of state M starting from byte index i and
ending at byte index j inclusive as shown in Figure 6.
Algorithm 2 Fault attack on Kalyna using known SBoxes. This algorithm recovers one
column of the round key
1: i : Round key index to recover. N : Number of Faults to Apply j: Round key column
to recover.
2: γ: Set of candidates for round key Ki. In order to refer to partial guess, we use the
same notation as we use for slices which is Ki[m,n] where m is the beginning of the
slice and n is the end of the slice.
3: Compute (255× 8) differences after the ψ operation and store them in λ
4: if i == Total Number of Rounds in Kalyna then
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5: Fault Round i N times in a way that the fault propagates to column j at ΔC,C′
which means that the state ΔC,C′ is all zeros except column j
6: else
7: Fault Round (i − 1) N times in a way that the fault propagates to column j at
Δwi−1,w′i−1 which means that the state Δwi−1,w′i−1 is all zeros except column j
8: end if
9: Consider N pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts (C,C ′)n where n  {1, 2, · · · , N }
10: // Start_Byte is byte index where we are starting our guess.
11: // End_Byte is byte index where we end our guess at this iteration.
12: // Bytes are numbered from 0 to 7 in a column where 0 is the least
13: // signiﬁcant byte and 7 is the most signiﬁcant byte
14: Start_Byte ← 0
15: End_Byte ← 1
16: // For intermediate rounds, peel off all subsequent
17: // rounds back to the state after key addition at round i
18: // Initialize pair of differences (D,D′)n to (C,C ′)n
19: if i != Total number of rounds in Kalyna then
20: Peel off all subsequent rounds until round i and analyze the states at the output of
the key addition at round i
21: (D,D′)n = (xi, x′i)n
22: end if
23: Consider the slice of key guessKi[Start_Byte, End_Byte]. We will append one more
byte guess at each step to this slice
24: // K ′i is the current key guess we are going to evaluate. We initialize it to 0 in the
beginning
25: K ′i ← 0
26: while End_Byte! = 7 do
27: // Now we are going to generate K ′i and check if it is a valid guesses
28: if End_Byte == 1 then
29: K ′i[Start_Byte] can take any value from 0x00 to 0xFF
30: else




34: K ′i[End_Byte] can take any values from 0x00 to 0xFF
35: Now, with the guessed K ′i, compute the following differences:
36: if i == TotalNumberofRounds then
37: Consider the differences for every pair (ηK′i)−1(D)⊕ (ηK′i)−1(D′)
38: else
39: // For intermediate rounds, we look at the difference after xi
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40: Consider the differences for every pair π−1(τ−1((ψ−1(D ⊕ K ′i)))) ⊕
π−1(τ−1((ψ−1(D′ ⊕K ′i))))
41: end if
42: if all differences analyzed are contained in Λ[Start_Byte][End_Byte] then
43: Add K ′i[Start_Byte][End_Byte] into Ki[Start_Byte][End_Byte]
44: end if
45: // increment End_Byte
46:
47: End_Byte← (End_Byte+ 1)
Algorithm 2 does not work for the ﬁrst two round keys. This is because modulo 264
addition of K0 is the ﬁrst operation applied to plaintext and there is no round before K0. If
we can recover K1, we can get K0 from K1. However, since K1 is an intermediate round
key, we need to fault the computation at SBox input to round 0 but there is no SBox at
round 0 (round 0 only contains modulo 264 addition of round key K0). In order to recover
the ﬁrst two round keys, we apply the following steps. First, we ﬂip the most signiﬁcant bit
in P (call it P ′) and calculate C ′ . Then, analyze the difference at state x1 for C and C
′ . We
call this difference Δx1,x′1 . Using this difference, we recover the most signiﬁcant byte of
K0. Then, we repeat the attack for the remaining bytes of the plaintext, until all the bytes
of K0 are recovered. Finally, we recover K1 from K0.
According to our experiment results, using 10 faults, we end up with 2 candidates for
each column of the last round key. We experimented using Kalyna128-128, where we
ended up having 4 candidates (2 candidates for each column) for K10. This means that 20
faults (10 faults for each column) gives us 4 candidates for the last round key. If the block
size is 256, we end up with 16 (2 for each column and 4 columns) candidates with 40 faults
and if the block size is 512, we end up with 256 (8 columns) candidates with 80 faults.
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Table 3: Number of candidates for one column of the last round key in Kalyna128-128











Table 4: Number of candidates for one column of intermediate round keys between round
8 and round 2 inclusive in Kalyna128-128
Table 3 shows the number of candidates we retrieved based on the number of faults for one
column of the last round key in Kalyna128-128.
For the intermediate round keys, recovery was easier since we ended up with only
one candidate if we apply enough faults and our experimental results were close to our
estimation. Table 4 shows our experimental results for the recovery of one column of an
intermediate round key.
Based on the experiment results we performed on Kalyna128-128 using 100 random
user-deﬁned keys and 100 random plaintexts, it can be concluded that about 3 faults can
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uniquely determine half of the key for each intermediate round key. However, 1 fault only
eliminates a small fraction of candidates (log2(14025359.36) = 23.74). 2 faults was the
expected number of faults required to determine one column of an intermediate round key.
However, according to our experiment results, 2 faults do not always uniquely determine
one column of the key in all cases but 3 faults uniquely determine one column of the
key in all cases. This means that in Kalyna128-128, we need 6 faults to retrieve round
keys K8, K6, K4, K2. Note that round keys with odd indices can be retrieved using round
keys with even indices. So, no faults need to be applied for recovering round keys with
even indices. 10 faults are needed to recover each column of the last round key K10.
This means that we need about 20 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 = 44 faults to retrieve round keys
10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2. In that case, round key K10 will have 4 candidates but the other
round keys will be determined uniquely. So, 44 faults give us 4 possible set of keys. For
Kalyna128-256, the number of faults for each intermediate round is again 6 since it also has
two columns in the internal state and there are 6 intermediate round keys to recover, which
are K12, K10, K8, K6, K4, K2. In order to recover the last round key, number of faults is 20
since it has 2 columns. So, using our attack, 20+ (6× 6) = 56 faults gives us 4 candidates
for set of round keys except K0 and K1 in Kalyna128-256. Similarly, for Kalyna256-
256, the number of intermediate round keys to recover is 6 since it also has 14 rounds like
Kalyna128-256. However, the number of faults required to recover each intermediate round
key is 12 since there are 4 columns. The number of faults required to recover the last round
key is 40 since the internal state has 4 columns. So, 40 + (12 × 6) = 112 faults gives
us 16 candidates for set of intermediate round keys except K0 and K1 in Kalyna256-256.
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Table 5: Number of faults required to recover the set of round key candidates except K0
and K1 in Kalyna
Kalyna256-512 has the same block size as Kalyna256-256, hence, again we need to recover
4 columns of each round key. However, the number of intermediate round keys to recover is
8 since it has 18 rounds and we also need to recoverK14, K16. So, 40+(12×8) = 136 faults
gives us 16 candidates for the set of round keys. For Kalyna512-512, the number of rounds
is 18 so we have 8 intermediate round keys to recover. However, the number of faults for
each round key is 24 since there are 8 columns to recover. For the last round key, 80 faults
give us set 256 candidates for the last round key. So, applying 80 + (24 × 8) = 272 faults
gives us 256 candidates for the set of intermediate round keys in Kalyna512-512. Table 5
summarizes the expected number of faults to recover the round keys, except the ﬁrst two,
for different choices of l, k.
4.3 Fault Analysis on Kalyna with Unknown SBoxes
In this section, we consider Kalyna deployed with secret SBoxes. There are 4 different
SBoxes and we will refer to them as S0, S1, S2, S3. We also assume that the same SBoxes
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are used in the key scheduling. Deploying a cipher with secret SBoxes is not a new ap-
proach. A similar approach was used in the Russian standard GOST 28147-89 [38]. So,
it is possible that Kalyna may also be deployed with user deﬁned SBoxes in some appli-
cations. Even though Kerchoff’s principle states that security should depend only on the
secret key, secret SBoxes are used in some cryptographic devices and they are assumed to
increase the security. As an example, secret SBoxes are used in military products, gaming
systems, and Pay TV [5].
We applied ineffective fault analysis on Kalyna using stuck-at-0 fault model. In this
case, the attacker applies the fault by forcing a speciﬁc SBox output to 0 and the attacker
retrieves information about the secret parameters (secret round key, secret SBoxes) if an
ineffective fault occurs, that is if the correct and the faulty ciphertexts are the same (C =
C ′).
In our attack, we recovered K0 with 232 candidates and we also recovered the secret
SBox entries for all SBoxes with 28 candidate sets (1 set of candidates for each value of
S−1[0] for each SBox). Note that the attacker is able to retrieve K1 directly from K0.
This attack starts by iterating each byte of the plaintext until an ineffective fault occurs for
that byte. Our attack is similar to the ineffective fault analysis applied to Kuznyechik [30]
except that there are two differences. First, in here, we have 4 different SBoxes. Second,
we have to deal with the carry propagation when recovering K0. The SBox entries that















Algorithm 3 Recovering the ﬁrst round key of Kalyna based on 4 SBox inputs
1: K0 : set of candidates for K0
2: P : Plaintext and P[i] refers to byte index i of plaintext ξ: Ineffective bytes and ξ[i]
refers to byte index i of ineffective byte K ′0: Current guess for K0 Carry : Set of
places in modulo 264 addition where carry occurs
3: for i ← 0 to number of bytes in the state do
4: Iteratively exhaust P[i] and fault byte x1[i] (SBox output at round 1 and at index i)
until an ineffective fault occurs.
5: if Ineffective fault occurs then
6: ξ[i] ← P [i]
7: end if
8: end for
9: for Each guess for S−10 [0] || S
−1
1 [0] || S
−1
2 [0] || S
−1
3 [0] do
10: Fill carry[i] for each index by ﬁnding places where the carry occurs based on






3 [0] and values of ξ.
11: Set K ′0 to all zeros
12: for i ← 0 to number of bytes in the state do
13: if i mod 4 == 0 then
14: K ′0[i] = S
−1
0 [0]− ξ[i]− Carry[i]
15: else if i mod 4 == 1 then
16: K ′0[i] = S
−1
1 [0]− ξ[i]− Carry[i]
17: else if i mod 4 == 2 then
18: K ′0[i] = S
−1
2 [0]− ξ[i]− Carry[i]
19: else if i mod 4 == 3 then
20: K ′0[i] = S
−1
3 [0]− ξ[i]− Carry[i]
21: else
22: This else should never be reached
23: end if
24: // Add current key guess to set of key candidates.









0, if i % 8 = 0
1 if (i % 4 = 0) AND (i % 8 = 0) AND S−10 [0] < ξ[i− 1]
0 if (i % 4 = 0) AND (i % 8 = 0) AND S−10 [0] ≥ ξ[i− 1]
1 if (i % 4 = 1) AND S−11 [0] < ξ[i− 1]
0 if (i % 4 = 1) AND S−11 [0] ≥ ξ[i− 1]
1 if (i % 4 = 2) AND S−12 [0] < ξ[i− 1]
0 if (i % 4 = 2) AND S−12 [0] ≥ ξ[i− 1]
1 if (i % 4 = 3) AND S−13 [0] < ξ[i− 1]
0 if (i % 4 = 3) AND S−14 [0] ≥ ξ[i− 1]
From the ineffective fault at byte index i, we are able to write the following equation
according to encryption function and we used notation S−1(i % 4)[0] to refer to SBox used for
index i:
ξ[i] +K0[i] + Carry[i] = S
−1
(i % 4)[0] (4)
If our guess for the SBox entry S−1(i % 4)[0] is smaller than ξ[i], then equation 4 generated
a carry for the subsequent index (i+1). For the indices which are located in the beginning
of each column where (i mod 8 == 0), there is no carry from the previous index.
53
This attack gives us 232 candidates for K0 using 28 × 24 = 212 faults in the worst case
for Kalyna128-128 since Kalyna128-128 contains 16 bytes and we need 28 faults for each
byte. For Kalyna128-256, the number of faults is the same since the number of bytes in the
state is the same. For Kalyna256-256, the number of faults required is 28 × 25 = 213 since
Kalyna256-256 contains 32 state bytes. It is the same number of faults for Kalyna256-512.
For Kalyna512-512, the number of faults is 28 × 26 = 214 since Kalyna512-512 contains
64 state bytes.
After guessingK0 with 232 candidates, we also have 232 candidates forK1 sinceK1 can
be generated directly from K0. Our next step is to recover all SBox entries S0, S1, S2, S3






3 [0]. We are going to recover each SBox
entry separately by iterating two byte indices in the input to ψ operation while keeping all
the other indices in the column as 0. One of these byte indices is going to contain an
SBox entry we already recovered and another is going to be iterated by the attacker until
an ineffective fault is observed at x2 (SBox output at round 2 in a speciﬁc index). Figure 8
demonstrates how the state propagates if we give the input to Kalyna in a way that all bytes
in x1 are 0 except two indices. We call these two indices m and a. We have to choose these
indices in the way such that they go to same SBox.
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Figure 8: Calculation after forcing SBoxes at round 1 to all zeros in Kalyna







We use the MixColumns coefﬁcients υ in this recovery. The notation Sfault_index mod 4 [a]
means that we use SBox according to fault index, since the SBoxes are chosen according
to the byte indices, and we get an entry S(a) for the value a.
Algorithm 4 Recovering all SBox entries in Kalyna
1: S ′i : Set of candidate entries (m, Si[m]) for SBox Si
2: m : Refers to byte value iterated by the attacker. a: refers to byte value the attacker is
using from previous recovery. m_index : index where value of m is iterated. a_index
: index where value of a is used. fault_index: index where attacker faults SBox at
round 2
55
3: for Each SBox Si, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 do







5: a ← S−1i [0]
6: for m ← 0 to 255 do






3 [0] and the guess for K0,
ﬁnd the input plaintext which makes the state y1( after round 1 shift rows operation) all
zeros except for two indices, where y1[m_index] = m and y1[a_index] = a
8: Fault x2[fault_index] by forcing the output to 0.
9: if Ineffective fault occurs then
10: It means {(υ[a_index] ⊗ Si[a]) + (υ[m_index] ⊗ Si[m])} ⊕
K1[fault_index] = S−1fault_index mod 4 [0]
11: Find Si[m] as Si[m] = {(S−1fault_index mod 4 [0] ⊕ K1[fault_index]) −
(υ[a_index] ⊗ Si[a])} ⊗ (υ[m_index])−1
12: if m is not contained in S ′i then
13: Add (m , Si[m]) into S ′i
14: Set a to m
15: else







This algorithm iteratively recovers the SBox entries using already recovered entries
until all SBox entries for an SBox are recovered. If no other entries can be added to the
set of candidates, indices for m and a need to be changed. We experimented this algorithm
by randomizing all 4 SBoxes and running the experiment 100 times and we were able to
recover correct SBox entries each time. For the choice of indices for m and a, indices
which go to same SBox have to be chosen and this SBox has to be the SBox we are trying
to recover. However, the choice of fault_index does not depend on the SBox we are
aiming to recover since we already have candidates for S−1i [0], where i{0, 1, 2, 3} for each
SBox. In our experiments, we used indices 0, 12 in the ﬁrst phase and faulted SBox number
0. In the second phase, a is initialized to last found m value from the ﬁrst phase and SBox
number 5 was faulted. This allowed us to recover all entries for S0. The number of faults
required is 256. For S1, indices 1 and 13 were used for m and a. SBox at index 0 was
faulted in the ﬁrst phase of the attack and SBox 1 was faulted in the second phase. For
S2, indices 2 and 14 were used for m and a, SBox at index 1 was faulted in the ﬁrst phase
and SBox at index 2 was faulted in the second phase. For S3, indices 3 and 15 were used
for m and a and SBox at index 0 was faulted in the ﬁrst phase and SBox at index 2 was
faulted in the second phase. Since we were able to recover all SBox entries for each SBox
in the two phases, the number of faults required to recover each SBox is upper bounded by
2×256×256 since there are two phases, and for each of 256 entries we need to go through
all possible values of m, in worst case. So, this attack requires about 217 faults in the worst
case.
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Using the above attack, an attacker is able to retrieve 232 candidate pairs for the multiset













3 [0], K0, K1, EntriesforS0, EntriesforS1,
EntriesforS2, EntriesforS3)
This list is still small enough to be brute forced since it contains 232 elements.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we showed how to apply differential fault analysis on Kalyna. We also
showed how Kalyna with secret SBoxes can be attacked using ineffective fault analysis.
Our results show that importance of protecting the implementations of Kalyna against dif-




Kupyna is a recently selected Ukrainian hash function standard. It was designed based on
Kalyna block cipher. In this chapter, we apply differential fault analysis to Kupyna when
it is used as the underlying function in different MAC schemes and show how the secret
inputs can be retrieved.
5.1 Speciﬁcation of Kupyna
Kupyna hash function was originally proposed in 2015 as the standard DSTU 7564:2014
[60]. It uses the Davies-Meyer compression function based on the Even-Mansour construc-
tion and it supports digest size of n bits such that:
n = (8× s) bits, s  {1, 2, · · · , 64}
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In this chapter, we use Kupyna−n to refer to Kupyna hash function with n output bits.
The parameter n is chosen by the user and it determines three parameters which are the
internal state size l, the number of rounds of the compression function t, and the number of





512 bits if 8 ≤ n ≤ 256.
1024 bits if 256 ≤ n ≤ 512.
The compression function consists of two t-round ciphers which are very similar to




10, if 8 ≤ n ≤ 256.
14, if 256 ≤ n ≤ 512.
The size of the state matrix deﬁnes the number of columns c because the number of
rows is always 8 since Kupyna was designed to be compatible with 64-bit platforms (8




8, if l = 512.
16, if l = 1024.
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Figure 9 shows how Kupyna works. IV is a constant vector which is calculated accord-




1  510, if l = 512.
1  1023, if l = 1024.
Figure 9: Kupyna block diagram
Kupyna can process messages of length up to 296 − 1 bits. After a message input
with size N bits where 0 ≤ N ≤ (296 − 1) is given by the user, the message (M ) is
padded regardless of its length. The padding follows the message and contains a single 1
bit followed by d 0 bits, where d is calculated based on the internal state size (l) such that:
d = (−N − 97)mod l
61
After the padding, the message M is divided into k blocks with size l bits each, which
are:
m1,m2, · · · ,mk




⊕(hi−1 ⊕mi)⊕ τ+(hi−1)⊕ hi−1, for i = 1, 2, .., k
H(IV,M) = Rl,n(τ
⊕(hk)⊕ hk)
where Rl,n is the truncation function which retrieves n most signiﬁcant bits of input
of l bits, and hi is the hash value calculated by the compression function processing the
message block mi.
One compression function consists of two functions which are τ⊕ and τ+. These func-









(ψ ◦ α ◦ σ ◦ θ)
Figure 10 shows how these functions work for t rounds. As it can be seen, the only
difference between them is the fact that τ⊕ uses XOR addition for key mixing and τ+ uses
modulo 264 addition for key mixing.
Figure 10: τ⊕ and τ+ functions in Kupyna which work similar to Kalyna
We use the following notation throughout this chapter for referring to the state bytes:
Gi,j refers to row i and column j of the current state.
ψ is a linear transformation layer which uses the same vector υ as Kalyna:
υ = (0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01, 0x08, 0x06, 0x07, 0x04)
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The element at row i and column j of the new state matrix (G′i,j) is calculated as:
G
′
i,j = (υ≫ i)⊗Gj,
where Gj is column j of the current state matrix and ⊗ is Galois ﬁeld multiplication in
the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(28) with the irreducible polynomial γ(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1. This
operation is also referred as MixColumns.
α denotes the ShiftRows operation which circularly right shifts each row. There are 8
rows in the state matrix numbered as 0, 1, · · · , 7, and each row i is circularly right shifted
by i bytes except row number 7 which is circularly right shifted by 7 bytes if the block
size(l) is 512 bits and by 11 bytes if the block size(l) is 1024 bits.
σ is a non-linear transformation of bytes, also referred as SubBytes, where each byte
value is mapped to another byte value using the Kupyna SBoxes. Kupyna uses 4 different
SBoxes like Kalyna (S0, S1, S2, S3). For each byte in the current state Gi,j , the SBox to
apply is calculated as Si mod 4. So, the new state byte (G
′
i,j) is calculated as:
G
′
i,j = Si mod 4[Gi,j]
θ is modulo 264 addition of the round constant to the current state and κ denotes the
XOR addition of the round constant to the current state. The round constants are known
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and are calculated as follows:
For κ where the round constant((j)) is added to current state using XOR operation
(modulo 2 addition), (j) = ((j  4)⊕ v, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)T where v is the round number
and j is the column of the current state Gi,j .
For θ where the round constant(κ(j)) is added to current state using modulo 264 addi-
tion operation, κ(j) = ((0xF3, 0xF0, 0xF0, 0xF0, 0xF0, 0xF0, 0xF0, (c−1−j)  4))T
where c is the total number of columns in the state which is 8 for l = 512 and 16 for
l = 1024 and j is the column of current state Gi,j .
For the description of our attacks, we use the same notation to refer to the state inputs
except that we will have two subindices. The ﬁrst one refers to the block number, depending
on which mi is the input to the block and block numbers go from 1 · · · k, and the last τ⊕
block before truncation is a special block which will be referred to as block number k+1.
The second index refers to the round number where the round number goes from 0 to
(t− 1). For example, if we refer to block number k and the state input to substitution layer
in round t − 1 in τ⊕ operation of the block, we will refer that state as τ⊕[σk,t−1] where t
is the total number of rounds. In order to refer to a speciﬁc byte in the state located at row
i and column j, we use τ⊕[σk,t−1][i][j]. In order to refer to a speciﬁc function (τ⊕ or τ+)
within a block without referring to a speciﬁc state, we use the notation which includes the
name of the function and the block number. As an example, τ⊕k+1 refers to τ
⊕ function just
before the truncation step.
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5.2 Differential Fault Analysis on Kupyna with Known
SBoxes
Kupyna can be used to build MAC schemes in secret-IV or secret preﬁx mode. In the
secret IV mode, the IV is secret and it needs to be recovered in order to break the MAC
scheme. In the secret preﬁx mode, a secret input is appended to the input message such
that the message input to the hash function becomes Prefix ||M . If the attacker recovers
the secret preﬁx, then the MAC scheme is broken. In this attack we are going to recover all
the message blocks and the value of IV which allows us to break the MAC scheme if the
MAC scheme is used in secret-IV or secret preﬁx settings.
Our approach contains two stages. First, we aim to recover hk which is the input to
τ⊕[κk+1,0] as shown in Figure 9. So, τ⊕k+1 is the ﬁrst block we are going to apply faults.
After recovering hk, our next goal is to recover inputs to each block (m1,m2, · · · ,mk).
During this process, the IV is also recovered. It should be noted that the size of the hash
output is not the same as the size of the state since there is truncation step in Kupyna.
Hence, we ﬁrst recover some bytes of the state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1], we will refer to that partial
state as τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]·. After that, we recover the full state of τ⊕[σk+1,t−2] which allows us
to recover hk by going backward. In order to recover the inputs to a message block i, which
are hi−1 and mi, we ﬁrst recover the input to τ+[σi,t−1], then going backward allows us to
recover mi. After that we recover the input to τ⊕[σi,t−1] and going backward allows us to
recover the value of mi⊕hi−1. By knowing mi and mi ⊕ hi−1, we can recover hi−1. Then
the same approach is recursively applied to all the blocks until all inputs are recovered.
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In order to recover the partial state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]·, we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd bytes indices in the
state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1] that propagate to the output (see Figure 11 which shows indices of bytes
that survive after the truncation step). Faults are applied in the input to τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]. Some
faults give us information about state bytes in the input to last round SubBytes operation.
However, some faults do not give any information about the input state to the last round
SubBytes. As shown in Figure 11, if a fault is applied to the byte index 0 among the indices,
then this fault does not give any information about the partial state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]·. However,
if the fault is applied to the byte index 32, this fault gives us information about the byte
index 32 (row 0, column 4) of the partial state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]·. Using the same approach, we
recover all state bytes in the partial state that are propagated to the output.
Figure 11: Propagation of bytes to the output in Kupyna
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In order to ﬁnd the value of byte input in the partial state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]· for a speciﬁc
index among indices that survive the truncation step, we use the following property of the
SBoxes:
If x is a random input byte, and if Δi is chosen from the set:
Δ = {0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80}
where 1 < i ≤ n, and n is the number of faults. Then, x is uniquely deﬁned only using
the values for Λi in the following equation [4]:
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ Δi) = Λi (5)
This basically means that for x can be recovered using n output differences Λi corre-
sponding to n one-bit distinct faults Δi. According to our experiments, the average number
of faults required to recover x uniquely was 2.42 if known byte random fault model was
used. If known byte unique fault model was used, the average number of faults required to
recover x uniquely was 2.21.
In order to retrieve the state bytes in the partial state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]·, ﬁrst the attacker
calculates the correct hash value for a given message. After that, the attacker faults the
computation at τ⊕[σk+1,t−1] by applying one of the values among Δ to a byte value. The
attacker knows which byte was faulted if it is a chosen fault model. However, in the random
fault model, the attacker does not know which byte was faulted. After the attacker applies
68
the fault, she receives a faulty result. We call the correct hash value as H and faulty hash
value as H ′ . After getting H and H ′ , the attacker calculates the difference between H and
H
′ backward by calculating the following equation:
Ω = α−1 ◦ ψ−1(H ⊕ H ′) (6)
Figure 12 shows the propagation of a fault applied at byte index 4 in the input to SubBytes
operation in the last round.
Figure 12: Propagation of a fault applied at byte index 4 in Kupyna
Ω is calculated as the inverse MixBytes and the inverse ShiftBytes operations applied
to the difference between the correct state and the faulty state. The result of this calculation
will be all zeros except in one byte position and that byte position gives us which byte was
faulted and the nonzero value in that byte position gives us one value for Λ. Using this Λ,
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we ﬁnd candidates for the byte using equation 5. After that, we ﬁnd other values for Λ and
narrow down the list of candidates until there is only one candidate remaining. This allows
us to recover the partial state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]·.
After recovering the partial state of τ⊕[σk+1,t−1], the next step is to recover the full
state just before that partial state. This state, τ⊕[κk+1,t−1], can be recovered directly since
the round constant is known. However, recovering the input to the MixColumns operation
just before the addition of the round constant in the last round (τ⊕[ψk+1,t−2]) is a bit more
difﬁcult.
In order to recover the input to MixColumns operation in the round (t − 2), we are
going to use the following property of MixColumns operation used in Grostl [34]:
Let s  G be a state matrix with only one non-zero entry in row i and column j such
that Gi,j = s
′ and Gi,j = 0 for all other entries, then the value of s
′ can be determined by
knowing two entries in MixColumns operation applied to G.
This basically means that if we give an input to MixColumns operation a state matrix
which has only one nonzero entry, we can get this nonzero entry uniquely if we know at
least two bytes in the result of the MixColumns operation. Note that, this MixColumns
operation changes byte values in the same column as that nonzero entry. As shown in
Figure 13, if we give a state matrix as input which is all zeros except byte a, then we
can ﬁnd a uniquely if we know at least two entries among A, · · · , H . In order to use this
property, we fault the SBox input to round (t− 2), which is τ⊕[σk+1,t−2]. After faulting the
SBox input at round (t − 2), the attacker retrieves the correct and the faulty hash results
which areH andH ′ . Then, the attacker calculates the difference between these asH ⊕ H ′
70
Figure 13: Kupyna MixColumns with input which has only one nonzero byte
and calculates this difference backward by calculating the following equation:
Ω
′
= α−1 ◦ ψ−1(H ⊕ H ′)
However, since the SBox operation is not linear, in order to calculate the difference
between the correct state and the faulty state just before SBox operation, we will use the
bytes of partial state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1]· we recovered in the previous step which corresponds to
actual bytes in the correct state. Let xi be one of the bytes recovered in the previous step, i
be the byte index for xi and let G
′
[i] be the byte at index i at the faulty state , then
G
′
[i] = S(xi) ⊕ Ω′ [i]
gives us the byte value of the faulty state after the SubBytes operation and before ShiftRows
operation at round (t− 1), τ⊕[αk+1,t−1]. We do the same for all values of xi we recovered
in the previous step and we get the partial bytes of the faulty state after the ﬁrst SubBytes
operation in the last round. After that, if we go backward, by applying the inverse of
SubBytes (σ−1) operation to the bytes of the faulty state, we get the state difference after







Since we know the bytes just before SubBytes operation in the correct state and in the






This difference will have only one nonzero bytes in one column and using the property
of MixColumns operation, we are able to retrieve the location of the byte and the value
of the byte at the input to MixColumns operation at round (t − 2), τ⊕[ψk+1,t−2]. This is
the state matrix which has one nonzero byte value and applying the inverse of ShiftRows
to this state matrix (α−1(G′)), we get the difference after the SubBytes operation at round
(t− 2) and using equation 5, we are able to get SBox input to round (t− 2), so we are able
to recover the full state τ⊕[σk+1,t−2]. Then we are able to recover hk by going backwards
from the state τ⊕[σk+1,t−2].
After recovering hk, our goal is to recover the inputs to each block in order to break
the cipher. Since the attacker is only able to observe the correct and the faulty results, we
need to create a lookup table for each possible case when we apply fault analysis to recover
inputs of each block. This lookup table is created by applying possible differences that can
come from faults to hk before applying hk to the truncation function. In order to recover
mk and hk−1 for the block k, ﬁrst the attacker faults τ+[σk,t−1] and recovers the full state at
the input to the SBox operation at τ+ block of round (t− 1). After that, the attacker inverts
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that full state and recovers mk.
The next step is to recover hk−1. In order to do so, the attacker faults τ⊕[σk,t−1] and
recovers the full state at the input to the SBox operation at τ⊕[σk,t−1] block of round (t−1)
and inverts this state to recover hk−1 ⊕mk as shown in Figure 9. Using this known input
and the recoveredmk from the previous step, the attacker is able to recover hk−1. The same
procedure is applied for all other blocks from 1 · · · (k − 1).
For the known byte random and known byte unique fault models, each fault gives us
information about the state we are aiming to recover. However, in the random fault model,
some faults may end up giving no information about the state we are aiming to recover
since the difference between the correct result and the faulty result may be 0 if the faulted
byte was truncated by the truncation step.
So far, we have shown how to break Kupyna if it is used in the secret-IV or secret preﬁx
mode. We basically recover all inputs to the hash function including the value of IV and
m1. If Kupyna is used as the underlying block for HMAC, then the output is calculated as:
HMAC(K,m) = H((K ⊕ opad)||H((K ⊕ ipad)||m))
In this function, opad and ipad are known constants and K is the secret key we are
aiming to recover (see Figure 14).
In this case, we ﬁrst recover the input to the hash function which is ((K⊕opad)||H((K⊕
ipad)||m)). This allows the attacker to know the values of H((K ⊕ ipad)||m) and since
the value of opad is known, the attacker can determine the value of K. Using the value
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Figure 14: Kupyna in HMAC mode
of H((K ⊕ ipad)||m), which is the output of the ﬁrst hash block as shown in Figure 14,
the attacker can recover the input which is ((K ⊕ ipad)||m). Then, the value of K can be
recovered along with the value of m if the secret preﬁx is applied to the value of m.
In the case of NMAC, two keys are employed and the NMAC is calculated as:
NMAC(M) = HK2(HK1(M))
This is basically applying K2 and K1 instead of the known value of IV in Figure 14.
Similar to our attack in the HMAC case, we ﬁrst recover K2 which is the input to outer
block, then we recover K1 which is the input to the inner block.
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5.3 Fault Analysis on Kupyna with Unknown SBoxes
In the fault analysis performed on Kuznyechik with secret SBoxes [2], the ﬁrst step was
to recover the ﬁrst round key based on possible values for S−1[0]. Since S−1[0] can take
256 values, the attacker is able to ﬁnd the correct value of S−1[0] in 256 trials in the worst
case. After ﬁnding the correct value of S−1[0], the attacker retrieves input values for the
other SBox outputs using the recovered value for S−1[0]. In order to refer to a speciﬁc
SBox in a speciﬁc block and at a speciﬁc round, we use the notation Sb,t[i][j] where b is the
block number, t is the round number and i and j denote the row and column numbers of
the SBox. All faults are applied to SBoxes in τ+ function since it is easier for the attacker
to control the input to τ+ by choosing different messages as inputs. The attacker has direct
control over all message blocks except the last one since the last message block is used for
padding.
In Kupyna, unlike AES [21] and Kuzneychik [2], there is no secret round key. Thus we
are able to determine the SBox inputs that produce 0 as outputs for all the 4 different SBoxes
directly. This is a chosen plaintext attack. The only way to fault the computation is to force
a speciﬁc SBox output to 0. In order to recover S−1i [0] for a speciﬁc SBox, ﬁrstly, the
attacker needs to ﬁnd ineffective bytes [21], i.e., bytes values in the input for an index that
make the SBox output for that index 0. In this case, the SBox fault becomes ineffective fault
since the correct calculation and faulty calculation produce the same results. Algorithm 5
describes the attack to recover the SBox inputs that produce 0 output for each SBox:
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Algorithm 5 Recovering ineffective bytes in Kupyna
1: RC0 refers to the round constant matrix for round 0 in τ+
2: Set input M to 32 bits which has all zeros. We refer to input as M = m1||m2||m3||m4.
3: Initialize Ineffective Bytes[0 · · · 3] to all 0 s
4: for Each SBox index i from 0 to 3 do
5: for Each byte value from 0 to 255, called currentByte and IneffectiveByte is not
found do
6: Set mi to currentByte
7: Set input M to all zeros except mi which is currentByte
8: Calculate the hash value without fault, called H
9: Calculate hash value with fault to SBox S1,0[i][0]
10: if H is equal to H’ then
11: Set IneffectiveBytes[i] = currentByte and ineffectiveByte is found.
12: end if
13: end for
14: Calculate the SBox inputs which give output 0 for each SBox i as S−1i [0] =
IneffectiveBytes[i]−RC0[0][i]
15: end for
After ﬁnding the ineffective bytes, we subtract the round constants that are added to
those ineffective bytes to recover the SBox inputs. In that calculation, we do not take the
carry into account even though in τ+ addition of round constant is modulo 264 addition,
since we are only dealing with the addition operation in one byte. After ﬁnding the SBox
inputs that lead to zero, the next step is to recover all the SBox inputs and outputs. In order
to do so, we fault the SBoxes in the second round and we use two nonzero values in the ﬁrst
column of the state, one being an SBox entry we recovered before and the other being the
byte input we would like to ﬁnd and which forces the output of SBox in the second round
to 0. Figure 15 shows how the attacker is able to choose the input to hash function in a way
such that the state becomes all zeros except two positions after the ﬁrst round SubBytes
and the ShiftRows operations. Figure 15 also shows how the state propagates after σ1,0. In
this ﬁgure a is an SBox input that has been recovered and S(a) is the corresponding output,
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and m is the byte value that propagates from 0 to 255 until an ineffective fault occurs.
The attacker also needs to take the ShiftRow operation into account since the input to the
MixColumns operation has to be all zeros except the two bytes in the ﬁrst column. The
location of the fault is shown in red and faults are applied to the bytes in the state after σ1,1.
For S0, we use indices 0 and 4. For S1, we use indices 1 and 5. For S2, we use indices 2
and 6 and for S3, we use indices 3 and 7.
Figure 15: Kupyna SBox fault at round 1 and recovering SBoxes
Algorithm 6 explains steps to recover all SBox entries:
Algorithm 6 Recovering all SBox entries in Kupyna
1: Initialize RecoveredValues to empty set for each SBox.
2: FirstIndex refers to index where m is iterated
3: SecondIndex refers to index where a is used.
4: for each SBox index i from 0 to 3 do
5: Initialize a to S−1i [0] recovered in algorithm 5
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6: for each index from 0 to 7 which refers to bytes in the ﬁrst column of ψ1,0 do
7: for each m from 0 to 255 do
8: Find hash input which makes MixColumns input in round 0, ψ1,0 to all zeros
except ψ1,0[FirstIndex][0] = Si(m) and ψ1,0[SecondIndex][0] = Si(a)
9: Get the Hash output without fault, called H
10: Get the Hash output with faulted SBox at S1,1[index][0] called H
′
11: If ineffective fault occurs, ﬁnd the value of S(m) according to the Mix-
Columns operation that makes the output byte at index S1,1[index][0] = 0
12: If Si(m) is found uniquely, add (m,S(m)) to RecoveredV alues[i]
13: end for
14: Set a to the next value in RecoveredV alues[i] and ﬁnd another m,
15: If all possible RecoveredV alues[i] are used for a, then go to next index
16: end for
17: end for
The above attack allows us to recover all the four SBoxes used in Kupyna. Since the
round key addition is modulo 264 addition, sometimes we get two candidates for S(m). In
this case, we ignored those candidates and only add entries when we are able to determine
S(m) uniquely for a given m.
5.4 Simulation Results
For the ﬁrst experiment, we simulated Kupyna-256 using three different fault models and
using random inputs of 64 bytes which are processed in two blocks after padding. For the
known byte fault models, we estimated the number of faults required to recover the SBox
input for each byte, that is the number of Λ values that uniquely determine the value of x
in equation 5. For the unique fault model, the average number of Λ values that uniquely
determine x is 2.21. For the random fault model, the average number of Λ values that
uniquely determine x is 2.42. After that, we experimented each fault model 10 times and
calculated the average number of faults required to recover half of state at τ⊕[σk+1,t−1] and
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to recover τ⊕[σk+1,t−2], which are needed to recover hk. After that, we need to recover the
two inputs to each of the two blocks which are input values for hi and mi. Our simulation
results can be summarized as follows:
• For the known byte random fault model, the average number of faults required to
recover half of state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1] is 79.3, and the average number of faults required to
recover the full state τ⊕[σk+1,t−2] is 155.8. For block number 1, the average number
of faults required to recover the message input(m1) is 153.1, the average number
of faults required to recover the hash input(IV) is 157.7. For block number 2, the
average number of faults to recover the message input(m2) is 154.3, and the average
number of faults to recover the hash input(h1) is 155.1. These results are consistent
regarding the number of expected faults required to recover each byte.
• For the known byte unique fault model, the average number of faults required to re-
cover half of the state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1] is 70.7, and the average number of faults required
to recover the full state τ⊕[σk+1,t−2] is 141.3. For block number 1, the average num-
ber of faults required to recover the message input(m1) is 142.2, the average number
of faults required to recover the hash input (IV) is 142.1. For block number 2, the
average number of faults required to recover the message input(m2) is 140.6, and the
average number of faults required to recover the hash input(h1) is 143.9. These re-
sults are consistent regarding the number of expected faults required to recover each
byte.
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• For the random fault model, not every fault results in useful information since bytes
affected by the fault may be eliminated because of the truncation. In this model,
the average number of faults required to recover half of the state τ⊕[σk+1,t−1] is
454.5, and the average number of faults required to recover the full state τ⊕[σk+1,t−2]
is 587. For block number 1, the average number of faults required to recover the
message input(m1) is 535.4, the average number of faults required to recover the
hash input(IV) is 570.3. For block number 2, the average number of faults required
to recover the message input(m2) is 558.5, and the average number of faults required
to recover the hash input(h1) is 543.1.
For the second experiment, the only thing we had to verify is the fact that our attack suc-
cessfully recovers the SBox entries for all SBoxes. In order to do so, we experimented 10
times by using random SBoxes. In all cases, the SBox entries were recovered successfully.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated two different fault attacks against Kupyna. In the ﬁrst attack,
we assumed that Kupyna was used as the underlying hash function in a MAC scheme and
showed how the attacker is able to recover the secret inputs. In the second attack, we
assumed that Kupyna is used with secret SBoxes. According to our experiments, if Kupyna
is using two blocks for the given input, the input and the value of IV can be recovered using
about 855.3 faults in average when utilizing the known byte random fault model. We need
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780.8 faults in average when utilizing the known byte unique fault model, and 3248.8 faults
in average when utilizing the random fault model. We have also shown that keeping the
Kupyna SBoxes secret does not add a larger security margin since the round constants are
known and SBoxes can be recovered easily using the ineffective fault injection. In most of
our experiments, the attacker had to go through 4 indices in the second round in order to
recover all SBox entries. However, our ﬁrst attack is not applicable if the number of output
bits for Kupyna is smaller than 128 since we are not able to uniquely deﬁne input bytes to
ψ operation. However, this is not a limitation for our attack since the recommended modes
of usage for Kupyna are Kupyna-256, Kupyna-384 and Kupyna-512 [60].
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
To conclude, we analyzed two standard block ciphers and a standard hash function against
fault analysis attacks. Previous work on fault analysis shows that it is important to check
newly designed ciphers for their resistance against fault analysis. Ensuring the security
of the considered three primitives is important since they are going to be widely deployed
given the fact that they are national standards for the Russian Federation and Ukraine
We applied differential fault analysis to Kuznyechik and showed that 4 faults are re-
quired to break the cipher. We applied differential fault analysis and ineffective fault anal-
ysis to Kalyna and showed that even Kalyna512-512 can be attacked with a relatively small
number of fault injections. Ineffective fault analysis on Kalyna shows that even if the
SBoxes are secret, unprotected implementations of Kalyna can still be attacked using fault
analysis. Lastly, we analyzed the hash function Kupyna against its resistance to fault anal-
ysis and showed that secret inputs of Kupyna, when used as the underlying hash function
in different MAC schemes, can be retrieved using fault analysis.
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In what follows, we provide a summary of some possible future work directions:
• There are many different fault attacks applied to AES in the literature. Some of these
attacks utilize fault models different than the ones considered in this thesis. The
resistance of Kuznyechik, Kalyna and Kupyna should also be checked when these
other fault models are utilized.
• Studying the resistance of the three cryptographic standards considered in this thesis
against different forms of side channel attacks, such as timing and power analysis
attacks, is an interesting research direction.
• Our work focused on how to break the considered ciphers using fault analysis. A
natural future research direction would be studying how to protect implementations
of these three ciphers against fault attacks without introducing a large area or time
overheads to the implementations.
• Apart from the attack on Kuznyechik which requires only about 4 faults, the attacks
on both Kalyna and Kupyna require somewhat a large number of faults which can
be impractical in some implementation scenarios. Investigating how to reduce the
number of required faults is certainly another challenging and interesting research
direction.
• From our analysis of the three ciphers, it is clear that the key schedule of the ci-
pher can play a great role in improving the cipher resistance against fault analysis
attacks. A possible future research direction would be studying how to design the
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key schedule of the cipher in order to optimize its resistance to different forms of
implementation dependent attacks, including fault analysis.
• In the current literature, there are many works studying the resistance of ciphers un-
der attacks that can be looked at as combination of some mathematical attacks (e.g.,
differential linear cryptanalysis, multiple differential/linear cryptanalysis). An inter-
esting research direction is to investigate new classes of attacks that are composed of
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